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A JOB HALF-DONE: FLORIDA'S JUDICIAL MODIFICATION
OF THE INTRAFAMILIAL TORT IMMUNITIES
MICHAEL A. YOUNG
I. INTRODUCTION
American legal systems have long recognized the crucial role that
the family plays in maintaining a healthy and ordered society. The
Supreme Court of Florida recently reaffirmed its belief that the
family unit is important to society and worthy of judicial protec-
tion. Justice Overton, writing for the court in Hill v. Hill stated:
"The family continues to be an unofficial sociological governmental
structure necessary and vital to our free, independent society....
Protection of the family unit is a significant public policy and we
are greatly concerned by any intrusion that adversely affects the
family relationship or the family resources.'"
Along with Hill, the court recently has decided five other cases
involving the family unit.' All of these cases questioned Florida's
use of intrafamilial tort immunities, which prevent certain family
members from suing other family members in tort. In deciding
these cases, the court desired not only to protect the family unit,
but also to make the intrafamilial immunities more consistent with
Florida's comparative negligence theory of tort liability.3
This comment will analyze Florida's current use of the in-
trafamilial immunities, as established by the six recent decisions.
It will examine whether the immunities actually do protect the
family unit or only prevent valid legal claims from being brought
to court. Florida's use of both parental immunity, which prevents
an unemancipated minor from suing his parents in tort, and inter-
spousal immunity, which prevents a person from suing his or her
spouse in tort, will be analyzed. Florida's rationale for using these
immunities will then be compared to other states' rationales for
not using immunities or for only partially using the immunities.
Finally, this comment will evaluate whether the court has success-
fully modified the immunities to make them compatible with Flor-
ida's comparative negligence theory of tort liability.
1. Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. 1982).
2. Woods v. Withrow, 413 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 1982); West v. West, 414 So. 2d 189 (Fla.
1982); Roberts v. Roberts, 414 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1982); Joseph v. Quest, 414 So. 2d 1063 (Fla.
1982); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066, 1070 (Fla. 1982). All six cases were decided on April 29,
1982.
3. See Woods v. Withrow, 413 So. 2d 1179. Florida adopted comparative negligence in
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
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The court's recent decisions modified Florida's position on pa-
rental immunity, but continued Florida's historic position on inter-
spousal immunity. The court waived parental immunity to the ex-
tent of the parent's liability insurance coverage.4 This gives
children of insured parents the right to sue their parents' insur-
ance company, up to the amount of the policy, for injury caused by
their parents' negligence.5 If the parents' policy has an exclusion
clause for family members, or the parent is uninsured, the immu-
nity is not waived and the child may not sue.6
The court further held that a negligent parent is liable via con-
tribution to a joint tortfeasor, but only to the extent of liability
coverage.7 This gives negligent tortfeasors the right to recoup a
percentage of money they paid out in damages to the child from
the parents who also acted negligently towards the child.8 The
court did not change the doctrine of interspousal immunity.9
These decisions significantly increased a child's ability to seek a
tort remedy against a parent without damaging family relations.
Yet the court should significantly increase a person's ability to
seek a tort remedy against his spouse for exactly the same reasons
it increased a child's right to sue. Waiving interspousal immunity
to the extent of liability insurance is appropriate. Florida can do
this without injuring the family unit, and can make its use of the
intrafamilial immunities more compatible with its theory of com-
parative negligence.
II. PARENTAL IMMUNITY
A. History
Although this comment advocates treating interspousal immu-
nity and parental immunity similarly, the immunities have differ-
ent histories and different reasons prompting their usage. Parental
immunity was judicially created in the 1891 Mississippi case of
Hewellette v. George,10 in which a minor daughter was suing her
4. Ard, 414 So. 2d at 1067.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Quest, 414 So. 2d at 1063.
8. Id. Insurance companies, not individuals, usually recoup money through contribu-
tion. This notion of "contribution" fits in well with Florida's theory of comparative negli-
gence and will be discussed more thoroughly in the Comment.
9. See Hill, 415 So. 2d 20; West, 414 So. 2d 189; Roberts, 414 So. 2d 190.
10. 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891). Although the first parental immunity cases involved inten-
tional torts, the immunity applies in negligence cases also.
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father for wrongfully confining her to an insane asylum. The court
responded on public policy grounds and with no legal precedent
when it held:
[S]o long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide, and
control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and
comfort and obey, no such action as this can be maintained. The
peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a
sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families
and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right
to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for
personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.1
The reasons for creating the immunity were to protect parental
discipline from being encroached upon by law suits, and to prevent
the disruption of family relations."
Other American jurisdictions began to judicially adopt this im-
munity,"3 and by 1905 in Roller v. Roller,4 the Supreme Court of
Washington went so far as to say: "At common law it is well estab-
lished that a minor child cannot sue a parent for a tort.' 5 This,
however, was a misconception, as there existed at least one English
common law case that allowed a minor to sue a parent for personal
injuries caused by her mother."e Further, most of the jurispruden-
tial authorities before 1891 believed that a child would have a
cause of action for unreasonable chastisement by a parent.' 7
Common law gave children the right to sue family members in
many situations. A child, through a guardian ad litem could sue
his parents in property and contract disputes.'" A minor child
could sue a minor sibling in tort.'9 With this background, it is ob-
vious that common law did not espouse the doctrine of parental
11. Id. at 887.
12. Id.
13. The great trilogy of cases: Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891); McKelvey v.
McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903); Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905), was responsi-
ble for indelibly engraving parental immunity upon American jurisprudence.
14. 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905).
15. Id. at 789. The court must have thought parental immunity was the equivalent of
interspousal immunity, which did exist at common law.
16. Ash v. Ash, Comb. 357, 90 Eng. 526 (1696) (where a child recovered 200 pounds in
damages from her mother who intentionally injected the child with medicines and subse-
quently tortured the child).
17. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030, 1060
(1930).
18. Id. at 1057-58.
19. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 866 (4th ed. 1971).
1983]
642 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:639
immunity.2 ° American jurisdictions, however, continued to adopt
the immunity, believing that parents who had tortiously injured
their children would pay enough through a criminal action and
making them pay in a civil action was unnecessary.21
Florida first considered adopting the immunity in 1961. In
Meehan v. Meehan,22 a father was suing one minor son for causing
the death of his other minor son.23 The older brother, Edward, had
negligently failed to inform his younger brother, James, of a defec-
tive condition of an electrical buffing machine and, as a result, the
younger brother was electrocuted. The Second District Court of
Appeal held that a parent cannot maintain an action in tort
against an unemancipated minor child 24 because of the "necessity
for the encouragement of family unity and the maintenance of
family discipline. ' '25
The Supreme Court of Florida did not specifically adopt paren-
tal immunity until it decided Orefice v. Albert,26 in 1970. Michael
Betz, a minor, was killed along with his father in an airplane crash
caused by his father's negligence. Orlo Betz, Michael's father, was
co-owner of the airplane with Albert. Orefice, the administratrix of
Michael's estate, sued Albert claiming him to be vicariously liable
for Michael's death since he was co-owner of the airplane. The
court held that Albert, as co-owner of the plane, might be liable to
Michael's estate but that Orlo, as co-owner of the plane, could not
be liable to Michael's estate because the doctrine of parental im-
munity protected him from suit by this minor child.27 The court
went on to say: "It is established policy, evidenced by many deci-
sions, that suits will not be allowed in this state among members of
a family unit for tort. Spouses may not sue each other, nor chil-
dren their parents. The purpose of this policy is to protect family
harmony and resources. '28
20. Other nations of common law origin allow minors to sue their parents in tort. E.g.,
Deziel v. Deziel [1953] 1 Dom. L. Rep. 651, (Canada) and Young v. Rankin [1934] Sess.
Cass. 499 (Scotland).
21. 79 P. at 789.
22. 133 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).
23. Id. at 777. The case illustrates that parental immunity operates symmetrically and
bars a parent from suing a child, even though these suits are rare.
24. The court defined minor as anyone under 21 years of age, and emancipation as a
complete severance of the filial tie. Id. 2d at 778-79.
25. Id. at 777.
26. 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970).
27. Id. at 145-46.
28. Id. at 145. It is worth noting that since the wife was the only family member left
living, allowing the suit would not have destroyed family unity.
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B. Florida's Current Use of Parental Immunity
1. Reasons for Partially Retaining Immunity
In Ard v. Ard,2 9 the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed its adher-
ence to the doctrine of parental immunity. It stated that the im-
munity would be waived to the extent of the parent's available lia-
bility insurance coverage and went on to explain its reasons for not
totally abolishing the immunity.30 Along with the historical reasons
of preservation of domestic harmony and prevention of interfer-
ence with parental care, discipline and control, the court also rec-
ognized as reasons for retaining the immunity "[d]epletion of the
family assets in favor of the claimant at the expense of the other
family members;. . . and the possibility of inheritance by the par-
ent of the amount recovered by the child."31 The court concluded
that since Finn v. Finn2 "[r]ecognized the duty of the parents to
nurture, support, educate and protect minor children,"" a suit re-
ducing family assets would hinder a parent's ability to perform this
duty. The danger of fraud and collusion between the parent and
child when insurance is involved is also a reason for the immunity,
but one not accepted in Florida. "
Many American jurisdictions and legal scholars believe that the
benefits which accrue to society through the use of parental immu-
nity are insignificant compared to the harm done by denying an
individual a civil remedy for an injury caused him by another."
Because of this policy determination, they do not accept as valid
the reasons Florida offers for retaining the immunity. Professor
Prosser contended that domestic tranquility and parental disci-
pline are not maintained by the immunity. 6 He argued that leav-
ing a tort uncompensated is not going to contribute to "peace in
29. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066. For a discussion of Ard v. Ard, as decided by the Florida First
District Court of Appeal, see Note, Parental Immunity, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 185 (1982).
30. 414 So. 2d at 1067.
31. Id. at 1068. The court mentions that the possibility of parental inheritance is a rea-
son frequently offered but doesn't elaborate as to whether Florida accepts this reason.
32. 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975).
33. Ard, 414 So. 2d at 1067, citing Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975).
34. See supra text accompanying notes 64-74. Florida refutes this reason in Ard.
35. There are 20 states which have either partially waived parental immunity or have
abrogated it. These states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont and Wisconsin.
36. PROSSER, supra note 19, at 866.
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the family and respect for the parent. ' 37 Some cases in which pa-
rental immunity is recognized involve parents raping or brutally
beating their children. One may question whether denying a civil
remedy is likely to restore domestic harmony in such cases.38 Fur-
ther, Prosser questioned why this family harmony rationale is not
applied to unemancipated minors who sue their parents for a tort
against their property or who sue their minor brothers or sisters in
tort.39
Florida's other reasons for recognizing the immunity, asset de-
pletion in favor of the claimant at the expense of other family
members and the possibility that the parent might inherit the
amount recovered by the child, have also been described as ill-
founded.40 The asset-depletion argument has been discredited on
the grounds that it "assumes an equality among the children and
an intention on the part of parents to treat their children
equally. 4 1 There is no legal duty to dispense funds to children
equally." Further, if one child has been injured while the others
have not, there is a valid reason for using family assets in favor of
the injured child.4 - Finally, it is argued that family assets will be
depleted when an unrelated third party is injured by the negli-
gence of a family member, so why not deplete them when a family
member is injured."
The possibility that a parent might inherit the amount recovered
by the child is offered as a reason for retaining the immunity be-
cause if a parent ultimately receives what the child recovered, the
parent would be profiting from his own wrongdoing.45 This possi-
bility was declared to be a remote contingency and one equally ap-
plicable to suits over property in the New Hampshire case of Dun-
37. Id.
38. This question was raised in Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 12 (N.C. 1923). Obviously
denying a remedy is not going to restore family harmony in serious intentional cases, but
many cases involve only accidental negligence and harmony may be restored by preventing a
minor from taking his parents to court.
39. PRossan, supra note 19, at 866.
40. Berman, Time to Abolish Parent-Child Tort Immunity: A Call to Repudiate Missis-
sippi's Gift to the American Family, 4 NOVA L.J. 25, 38 (1980) (asset depletion argument).
See also Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A. 905, 909 (N.H. 1930) (parental inheritance argument).
41. Id. at 38.
42. Note, The Parent-Child Tort Immunity Law in Massachusetts, 12 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 309, 314 (1976).
43. Berman, supra note 40, at 38.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Barlow v. Iblings, 156 N.W. 2d 105 (Iowa 1968).
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lap v. Dunlap." It was therefore dismissed as an inadequate
reason to support immunity. It and the unequal asset distribution
argument should not be reasons for retaining the immunity in
Florida.
2. Reasons for Partial Abrogation
While the court in Ard reaffirmed its adherence to the use of
parental immunity, it also provided reasons why the immunity
could be waived when insurance was involved. Parental immunity
was waived to the extent of liability insurance because insurance is
capable of protecting family assets and harmony while allowing a
cause of action to an injured minor. The court relied on the ration-
ale used by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Sor-
enson v. Sorenson." In waiving parental immunity to the extent of
automobile liability insurance the Sorenson court stated:
When an action is brought against a parent, frequently it will be
brought at the instance of, or with the approval of, the parent
with an eye toward recovery from the parent's already purchased
liability insurance. When there is no insurance coverage it is un-
likely that the suit will be brought against the parent .... We
should hold that the child is not to be denied the benefit of insur-
ance that would be available for a stranger."
Professor James noted this in a 1948 article, when he stated
that, "virtually no such [intra-family] suits [for negligence] are
brought except where there is insurance. And where there is, none
of [the] threats to the family exists at all."' 50 The Florida Supreme
Court based its decision to waive the immunity on this rationale,
and on the basis that "allowing a waiver of immunity where there
is liability insurance is a recognized policy in this state."'5'
The court further states that depleting family assets in a suit
where there is no insurance would interfere with a state's general
46. 150 A. 905.
47. Ard, 414 So. 2d at 1067.
48. 339 N.E. 2d 907 (Mass. 1975).
49. Id. at 913-14.
50. James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALz
L.J. 549, 553 (1948).
51. Ard, 414 So. 2d at 1069. Justice Boyd, dissenting in Ard, states that parents can
insure against accidental injuries to their children in the form of hospitalization, casualty
and disability insurance, and that it is "awkward" to use liability insurance covering the
parents. 414 So. 2d at 1070. Liability coverage allows for a more extensive recovery.
1983]
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interest in ensuring a parent's financial ability to care for and sup-
port her children.2 Because Florida waived the immunity when in-
surance is involved, family resources are protected without having
to deny an injured child a cause of action in tort. 3 The court again
quoted the Sorenson court which stated: "[I]nsurance cannot cre-
ate liability where no legal duty previously existed. . . .When in-
surance is involved . . . both parties seek recovery from the insur-
ance carrier to create a fund for the child's medical care and
support without depleting the family's other assets."5 A minor
need not sacrifice his cause of action to protect family resources.
Rather, by granting him a right to pursue what the court called
"[a]n otherwise valid action,"5 5 family resources are better
protected.
The Ard court also noted that the action between the parties is
not truly adversary when insurance is involved.56 In Streenz v.
Streenz,57 the Arizona Supreme Court stated: "Where such insur-
ance exists, the domestic tranquility argument is hollow, for in re-
ality the sought after litigation is not between child and parent but
between child and parent's insurance carrier. ' 58 Justice Boyd, dis-
senting in Ard, claimed that just being on the opposite sides of a
lawsuit is sufficient to put people in an adversary position, and
that a liability insurance carrier is entitled to expect its insured to
behave in an adversary manner towards the injured plaintiff.59 In-
surance attorneys claim that an intrafamily suit will be friendly
and that the insurance carrier will only be able to expect minimal
cooperation from the insured."" Professor Vance points out that
the charge that the insured failed in his duty to assist the insurer
frequently arises where the insured is sued by a member of his own
family. 1
Vance goes on to explain that a cooperation clause normally re-
quires that one aid in the securing of witnesses, and in informing
52. 414 So. 2d at 1067.
53. Id. Children of uninsured parents are still denied the right to sue.
54. Id. at 1068 citing 339 N.E.2d at 914 (footnote omitted).
55. 414 So. 2d at 1070.
56. Id. at 1068.
57. 471 P.2d 282 (Ariz. 1970).
58. Id. at 284.
59. 414 So. 2d at 1070.
60. Casey, The Trend of Interspousal and Parental Immunity - Cakewalk Liability,
45 INS. COUNS. J. 321, 330 (1978).
61. W. VANCE, LAW OF INSURANCE 1003 (3d ed. 1951).
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the insurer of all the facts connected with the accident.6 2 The co-
operation requirement does not force parties into an adversary po-
sition, especially if all it requires is that one help provide witnesses
and information. Professor Vance explains: "Any sympathy which
the assured may express in favor of the plaintiff's cause of action,
or indeed aid given in securing evidence to support her cause, will
not, in the absence of failure to perform the specific acts required
by the co-operation clause, defeat recovery on the policy."
The biggest fear when insurance is available is that family mem-
bers will collude and bring fraudulent suits.6 4 Some courts fear
that the parent and child might fraudulently represent the circum-
stances of the accident or the extent of the injuries." Moreover, it
has also been argued that it is often difficult in a particular case to
determine whether there has been collusion.6
The supreme court of Florida was not persuaded by these argu-
ments. It agreed with the Indiana Supreme Court's reasoning in
Brooks v. Robinson:67
The possibility of fraud and collusion exists in all litigation. How-
ever, we are not convinced that the danger is so great ... that
judicial relief should be summarily denied. Furthermore, it should
not be overlooked that the testimony of both parties will be ex-
tremely vulnerable to impeachment at trial on the grounds of
bias, interest and prejudice."
This reasoning assumes that the triers of fact will be able to suffi-
ciently weed out the fraudulent claims from the valid. Many states
claim that the courts are quite adequate for the task.6 9
The court is not the only body armed with devices to discover
collusive claims. The insurance company has its own resources.7
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Grilliot & Mishkind, Emancipation From the Family Immunity Doctrine, 15 Am.
Bus. L.J. 305, 308-09 (1978).
65. Id.
66. Vance, supra note 61 at 1004.
67. 284 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 1972).
68. Id. at 797.
69. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70, 73 (Cal. 1962), where the California Supreme
Court stated:
It would be a sad commentary on the law if we were to admit that the judicial
processes are so ineffective that we must deny relief to a person otherwise entitled
simply because in some future case a litigant may be guilty of fraud or collusion.
Once that concept were accepted, then all causes of action should be abolished.
70. See Comment, Lewis v. Lewis: Dissolving the "Metaphysical" Merger in Inter-
1983]
648 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:639
The insurer can protect itself from collusive suits through prompt
investigation 7 1 disclaiming liability due to breach by the insured of
the cooperation clause, 2 which occurs upon deliberate and willful
falsification of material facts 73 and by the threat of criminal action
against the insured. 4
Insurance companies in Florida have still another device to pro-
tect themselves from fraudulent claims-exemption clauses as to
family members.78 The court held in Ard that a policy containing
an exclusion clause for household or family members would pre-
vent children from suing. 6 The court stated that since liability in-
surance is optional as between the insured and the carrier, and
since there are valid policy reasons for such clauses, such clauses in
automobile policies are not void as against public policy.77 The pol-
icy reasons referred to were stated in Reid v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co.7 '8 The clauses were allowed because they protected
"the insurer from over friendly or collusive lawsuits between fam-
ily members. 7 9 However, if the courts can expose collusive suits,
one may wonder why such clauses are not void as against public
policy.
In Ard the court was making the determination as to whether
the fear of collusion should bar a cause of action and the court felt
that due to the superior interest of the injured claimant, public
policy would make the fear of collusion a secondary considera-
tion.80 In permitting insurance companies the right to use family
exclusion clauses, the court was supporting a public policy not to
hinder freedom of contract.81 If an insurance company doesn't
want to insure a policy holder's family out of fear of collusion, the
state will not force it to do so.
In addition, the court is allowing insurance purchasers the op-
portunity to take advantage of lower premium rates. In Florida
Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Government Employees Insurance
spousal Torts, 12 NEw ENG. L. Rav. 333, 341 (1976).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Sorenson v. Sorenson, 339 N.E.2d 907, 915 (Mass. 1975).
74. Comment, supra note 70, at 341.
75. 414 So. 2d at 1069.
76. Id. at 1067.
77. Id. at 1069.
78. 352 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 1977).
79. Id. at 1173.
80. Ard, 414 So. 2d at 1069.
81. See generally Reid, 352 So. 2d 1172.
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Co. the court observed that "insurance premiums may be estab-
lished in part by reference to potential exposure to liability by in-
surance companies and may be lower where those most likely to be
passengers in the automobile are expressly excluded from
coverage." 82
Justice Boyd, dissenting in Ard, claimed that insurers will use
this right to exclude family members preventing parental liability,
and thus "families will have no greater opportunity for financial
protection than they already have today.""" It is true that a policy
with an exclusion clause will prevent liability, but the degree to
which insurance companies will exclude family members is a mat-
ter of conjecture. The majority of the Ard court seemed to believe
that the effectiveness of waiving the immunity will not be under-
mined on such a wholesale basis.8 4
3. Scope of Waiver and its Effect on Discretionary Parental
Duties
The Ard court felt that if liability insurance covered the child's
injury, the insurance would protect the family unit and parental
immunity could be waived.85 The types of liability insurance avail-
able could then define the situations in which a parent will become
liable to his children in tort.8 Some policies, such as a personal
liability plan, will pay any amount to which the insured becomes
legally liable."
The Ard court suggests situations in which a parent will become
legally liable to his children in tort. It stated that the immunity
barred "an otherwise valid action." s This implies that the parent
82. 387 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla. 1980).
83. 414 So. 2d at 1071. See also Note, Intrafamilial Tort Immunity in New Jersey: Dis-
mantling the Barrier to Personal Injury Litigation, 10 RuT.-C m. L. Rav. 661, 681- n.152
(1979). (New York legislatively eliminated interspousal immunity and said there would be
liability only if specifically assumed in the policy). As predicted, liability policies issued in
New York do not customarily provide for the assumption of interspousal liability. The au-
thor went on to state that by waiving interspousal immunity but allowing exclusion clauses
the court was giving with one hand and taking away with the other.
84. Though not explicitly stated in the opinion, the court appears to have considered the
impact of allowing family exclusion clauses and believes such clauses will not destroy the
effectiveness of waiving the immunity.
85. 414 So. 2d 1066, 1068.
86. No insurance covers intentional tortious conduct, and consequentially, no child in
Florida can sue his parents for intentional torts.
87. A. MAYERSON, INTRODUCTION TO INSURANCE 123 (1962).
88. 414 So. 2d at 1070.
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owes a duty to act reasonably when dealing with his children. 9 Be-
cause the court did not define the parental duty, it may be as-
sumed that a parent can be found legally liable anytime he acts
unreasonably toward his children. A parent may be liable for negli-
gent performance of duties not uniquely parental, such as care-
lessly driving an automobile resulting in injury to the child or even
for the negligent performance of his discretionary parental duties
of care, education, and discipline.
While Florida courts apparently have the power to find parents
negligent in "parenting," two factors may inhibit the courts from
reaching this result. The first factor is that most child/parent suits
will only involve automobile insurance.90 The Sorenson court ex-
plained why an automobile accident does not constitute negligent
parenting: "Neither parental authority and discipline nor parental
discretion in child care is called into question by an automobile
accident case."' 1 The second factor is that some Florida courts
have held that discretionary parental duties should not be subject
to attack.92 However, the fact that the Florida Supreme Court has
declared a parent liable in contribution to a joint tortfeasor for
negligent supervision of a child lends some support to extending
liability into parental duties.' s
Other jurisdictions have held that a parent's discretion in per-
forming his parental duties should not be subject to a judicial stan-
89. Justice Boyd, dissenting in Ard, takes this view: "Under the doctrine, as we have
traditionally adhered to it, the law simply does not recognize parental negligence causing
injury to the child as an actionable tort." 414 So. 2d at 1070.
90. The court noted that most of the states' decisions limiting the application of the
immunity involve the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. The court impliedly predicts
that the most common child/parent suit will involve automobile accidents.
91. 339 N.E.2d 907, 916 (Mass. 1975). Further, most kinds of liability insurance will
cover only non-parental types of duties (duties owed to everyone).
92. See Rickard v. Rickard, 203 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). New York abolished the
parental immunity but held there was no liability directly or indirectly through contribution
for negligent supervision, because the parent owed no duty to the child in this area. See
Holodook v. Spencer, 364 N.Y.S. 2d 859 (1974). The Florida Third District Court of Appeal
adopted this reasoning in 3-M Electric Corp. v. Vigoa, 369 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
(holding that there was no right to contribution when a parent had allegedly been negligent
in supervising his child). The Third District has since changed its mind. See Quest v. Jo-
seph, 392 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), rev'd, 414 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1982).
93. The court, in permitting contribution to the extent of liability insurance, said, "we
make no distinction between the type of negligence of the parent, whether active or passive,
so long as it is a cause of the injury." 414 So. 2d at 1065. It is important to note that the
effect of the intrafamilial immunities on contribution has received a totally different treat-
ment from that of the immunities in directly barring actions between family members. See
infra, text accompanying notes 106-123.
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dard of reasonableness when a child sues a parent in tort.e9 New
York has waived parental immunity, but held that a child did not
gain the right to sue a parent in his uniquely parental role." The
New York court's reasons for this are typical of the reasons urged
in other jurisdictions. In Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc.,
the court noted that the idiosyncracies of each parent-child rela-
tionship may be so varied that no standard of conduct is ascertain-
able and that applying a reasonable man standard in situations
where parents are economically unable to care properly for chil-
dren would be unjust."e The Holodook court held that a "reasona-
ble parent" standard would not be used to determine what consti-
tutes adequate parental supervision. It stated that this standard
might "circumscribe the wide range of discretion a parent ought to
have in permitting his child to undertake responsibility and gain
independence. '' e7 Florida must now decide whether partially waiv-
ing immunity has granted children the right to question their par-
ents' performance of uniquely parental functions or whether Flor-
ida will follow the New York approach and prevent such suits.
4. The Impact of Comparative Negligence
Now that parental immunity has been partially abrogated, it
must be determined whether the current use of the immunity is
consistent with Florida's comparative negligence theory of tort lia-
bility announced in Hoffman v. Jones."8 In Hoffman, the Supreme
Court of Florida stated that: "In the field of tort law, the most
equitable result that can ever be reached by a court is the equation
of liability with fault."' It is for this reason that juries in Florida
apportion the total damages in proportion to the fault of each
party. 10 0
The court stated in Ard that waiving the immunity merely al-
lowed recovery for a duty that parents have long owed their chil-
94. See infra, text accompanying notes 133-140.
95. See 364 N.Y.S. 2d 859, where the New York Court of Appeals held that a child could
not sue his parents for negligent supervision. It should be noted that a child can base paren-
tal liability on employer-employee relation, master-servant relation, or passenger-carrier re-
lation. See 59 Am. Jim. 2d Parent and Child § 153 (1971).
96. Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc., 355 N.Y.S.2d 432, 440 (App. Div. 1974).
97. 364 N.Y.S. 2d at 871. This approach makes much sense to those who believe that
parents should have autonomy in determining how to raise their children.
98. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
99. Id. at 438.
100. Id. at 439.
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dren. 101 Children can now recover for a parent's breach of this
duty,102 and the court's decision in Ard is compatible with Flor-
ida's theory of comparative negligence. The negligent parent is
now going to have to pay in proportion to his fault.10 3
The First District Court of Appeal, in Mieure v. Moore,"04 ar-
gued that an abrogation of family immunity "would be consistent
with the recent development that a loss should be apportioned
among those whose fault contributed to the event."10 5 This is true,
but fails to take into consideration the valid policy reasons behind
partially retaining the immunity. The court in Ard was able to re-
tain family harmony, parental discipline and family resources,
while modifying parental immunity to be more consistent with
Florida's comparative negligence theory of tort liability.
5. Contribution and Immunity
Another question is how family immunity is treated for purposes
of contribution. In Joseph v. Quest,"°6 the court held that contri-
bution is available against a parent to the extent of existing liabil-
ity insurance coverage for the parent's tort against their child.107
To see how this is consistent with comparative negligence we
must first see how Florida has treated the doctrine of "contribu-
tion." In the case of Lincenberg v. Issen,10 s Florida discarded the
precedent of not allowing contribution among joint tortfeasors.
The court claimed that the precedent was inconsistent with the
newly accepted doctrine of comparative negligence.10 9 The supreme
court explained why contribution would be allowed by stating:
[I]n light of Hoffman and public policy, as a matter of judicial
policy, it would be undesirable for this Court to retain a rule that
under a system based on fault, casts the entire burden of a loss
101. 414 So. 2d at 1070.
102. Id. at 1067.
103. Id. But a parent will have to pay no more than the limits of his insurance coverage.
104. 330 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), rev'd on other grounlds, 353 So. 2d 825, 826
(Fla. 1977).
105. Id. at 547.
106. 414 So. 2d 1063.
107. Id. at 1065. Contribution is also discussed in Woods v. Withrow, 413 So. 2d 1179
(Fla. 1982), along with an elaborate discussion of the effect of a "release."
108. 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975).
109. Id. at 391. Contribution among joint tortfeasors is used in Florida because joint
tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount of damages. Id. at 394.
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for which several may be responsible upon only one of those at
fault. 10"
The legislature then passed the Uniform Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasors Act.' This act was amended and now mandates
that joint tortfeasors' relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for
allocation of liability.' 12 Although this statute establishes that a
tortfeasor could seek contribution in Florida, the family immunity
doctrine can still bar his recovery.
Traditionally, any tortfeasor had to be directly liable to the
plaintiff in order to be liable in contribution to another
tortfeasor."15 Thus, since a parent was immune from suit by his
children, he could not be liable to a joint tortfeasor for contribu-
tion, even though he was negligent towards his children. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court changed this when it held, in Shor v. Paoli,",
that the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity would not
bar contribution from a wife who was a joint tortfeasor."6 The
court reasoned that the law of contribution was meant to appor-
tion the responsibility to pay innocent, injured third parties among
those causing the injury, and that by letting contribution control
over interspousal immunity it would be possible to apportion re-
sponsibility among joint tortfeasors without interfering with inter-
spousal immunity's function of preserving the family unit."' The
court, in Joseph v. Quest, used the same rationale in letting contri-
bution partially control over parental immunity.1 17 Indeed, this ra-
tionale is consistent with comparative negligence, as it apportions
liability among tortfeasors in relation to degrees of fault.
The question remains why the court made contribution contin-
gent upon liability insurance in parental immunity situations when
there is no such contingency for contribution in interspousal im-
munity. The court, in Joseph v. Quest, stated that it "recognize[s]
a legal difference between the husband and wife relationship and
110. Id. at 391.
111. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1975).
112. The statute was amended to allow for pro rats share of fault apportionment, and is
now called Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1981).
113. See Comment, Right of Contribution Is Not Barred by Doctrine of Interspousal
Immunity in Florida, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 167, 172 (1979) (the author points out that even
states using the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act required that a tortfeasor be
directly liable to the plaintiff before contribution would be allowed).
114. 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1977).
115. Id. at 826.
116. Id.
117. 414 So. 2d at 1063.
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that of parent-child." ''1 The court explained that "adults [are] ca-
pable of bringing suit independently and with full knowledge of
their financial relationship."11 9 This allows the injured party to de-
cide whether to bring suit against the non-spouse tortfeasor with
the possibility of contribution by the other spouse. 2 '
The situation is different, the court asserted, when minors have
to bring suit through a representative, usually the parents.12' The
court observed: "If the parents feared possible liability through
contribution then it would be their decision and not the child's to
withhold suit."' 2 2 Further, since any award the child receives is his
alone, the parents will not be able to use this money to offset their
liability. This will have a chilling effect on the parents' decision to
bring suit when their own negligence has been a factor.22 For these
reasons, the court limited contribution to the extent of insurance
in parental immunity cases.
C. Jurisdictions with Different Approaches
Other jurisdictions have abrogated parental immunity either in
whole or in part and have substituted approaches which they be-
lieve adequately protect the family unit without denying uneman-
cipated minors a tort remedy. Two states which use differing ap-
proaches are Wisconsin 1 24 and California.125 In Goller v. White,"6
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin dealt with a case in which a
twelve-year-old plaintiff alleged that his foster father was negligent
in permitting him to ride on the drawbar of a tractor and in not
taking him to the hospital for treatment after he fell off the trac-
tor. The court held that parental immunity would be abrogated
except in two situations: "(1) where the alleged negligent act in-
volves an exercise of parental authority over the child; and (2)
where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary pa-
rental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing,
118. Id. at 1064.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. Justice Boyd dissented in Joseph claiming that Shor should be applied in pa-
rental immunity cases because, "[t]he recovery from the non-family tortfeasor can simply be
reduced in proportion to the immune parent's percentage of causal responsibility." Id. at
1065.
124. Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963). Supplemental Opinion July 9, 1963.
125. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971).
126. 122 N.W.2d at 193.
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housing, medical and dental services, and other care." '27 The obvi-
ous intent of the court is to allow minors a cause of action for any
injury caused by the parent acting in a nonparental capacity, thus
not infringing upon the parent's discretion in performing their pa-
rental obligations. Florida's recent holding might well do the same,
but the Wisconsin rule does not depend on the existence of
insurance. 128
In Gibson v. Gibson the California Supreme Court criticized
Wisconsin's limited use of the immunity because it draws an arbi-
trary distinction as to when particular parental conduct falls
within the immunity.12 9 The court further stated, "we find intoler-
able the notion that if a parent can succeed in bringing himself
within the 'safety' of parental immunity, he may act negligently
with impunity. 1 3 0 The Wisconsin approach also allows an unin-
sured parent to be sued, and thus disrupts family harmony and
resources.
Another approach very similar to that in Goller was employed in
Schenk v. Schenk.1 3 ' In this case, the Illinois appellate court
waived parental immunity for tortious conduct having no direct
bearing on the family relationship. The court stated, however, that
to abrogate the immunity rule would "inject into the courts a judi-
cial supervision over everyday family conduct of parent and child,
and invite endless litigation over what is or is not ordinary negli-
gence in the operation of a household. 1 32 But the court felt that it
should not bar recovery for tortious conduct wholly unrelated to
the objectives or purposes of the family itself.
After deciding to abolish parental immunity, the California Su-
preme Court in Gibson v. Gibson 3' decided to use the "reasonable
and prudent parent" standard to measure parental conduct. The
court felt that a parent should be liable for the negligent exercise
127. 122 N.W.2d at 198. Courts have been very willing to treat negligent supervision as
falling within this exception. See Note, Parental Immunity for Negligent Instruction De-
nied, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 219, 224-25 (1980).
128. The court stated, "the mere fact that the particular defendant-parent is protected
by liability insurance does not enable his minor child to maintain an action when, in the
absence of such insurance, he could not otherwise maintain it." 122 N.W.2d at 197. The
court admitted that widespread use of liability insurance was a factor in partially abrogating
the immunity.
129. Gibson v. Gibson, 92 Cal. Rptr 288, 293 (1971).
130. Id. Of course this argument applies any time parental immunity is even partially
used, as in Florida.
131. 241 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
132. Id. at 15.
133. 479 P.2d 648.
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of familial duties and powers and noted the practical effect that
the prevalence of liability insurance had on intrafamilial suits.'3 4
Advocates of the California position state that in determining the
reasonableness of the parent's conduct, the court can look to the
capacity of the child, his intelligence and whether there were spe-
cial conditions of the family which created any exigency justifying
the parent's conduct."" They further claim that "the 'reasonable-
ness' standard is not calculated to subject parents to liability for
every mistake, but rather to subject parental conduct to judicial
scrutiny in order that clearly unacceptable conduct give rise to tort
liability. 13 6 The Holodook court attacked this approach stating
that the necessary degree of discipline and supervision of a partic-
ular child cannot realistically be subjected to a judicial determina-
tion of reasonableness. 137 This determination of reasonableness se-
verely undermines the discretionary role of parenting and requires
that parents conform to a community standard that may be di-
rectly at odds with the parents' belief as to how to raise their
children.
Other jurisdictions recognize parental immunity, but create ex-
ceptions for situations when the child brings the action against the
estate of the deceased parent. 38 The logic here is that there will
obviously be no disruption of family harmony or parental disci-
pline. Another recognized exception exists when the parent's tort
constitutes willful misconduct. 39 The reasoning for this exception
is that family harmony is irretrievably disrupted by any inten-
tional or willful tortious conduct and there is very little possibility
of collusive claims when insurance is involved in these cases.
134. Id. at 653.
135. Comment, The "Reasonable Parent" Standard: An Alternative to Parent-Child
Tort Immunity 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 795, 810 (1976).
136. Id.
137. 364 N.Y.S. 2d at 871. It stated: "Considering the different economic, educational,
cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds which must prevail, there are so many combina-
tions and permutations of parent-child relationships that may result that the search for a
standard would necessarily be in vain-and properly so. Id. See also, Comment, 47 U. COLO.
L. REV. 795, 810.
138. See, e.g., Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Palcsey v. Tepper, 176
A.2d 818 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1962); Dean v. Smith, 211 A.2d 410 (N.H. 1965).
139. See, e.g., Horton v. Reaves, 526 P.2d 304 (Colo. 1974); Wright v. Wright, 70 S.E.2d
152 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952); Cowgill v. Boock, 218 P.2d 445 (Or. 1950).
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III. INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY
A. History
Interspousal immunity has its origins in the common law,140 and
was adopted by Florida in 1829 when the legislature stated that
the common law of England would be in force in this state.1 4' The
current reasons for recognizing the immunity are very similar to
those associated with parental immunity: preserving family har-
mony, protecting family resources, and fear of collusive suits. 42
The historical basis for the immunity was the legal unity of hus-
band and wife.' 43 At common law the wife's personal and property
rights were suspended for the duration of the marriage and were
merged into those of the husband.'4 4 The husband became liable
for the torts his wife committed either before or during the mar-
riage and was also entitled to all of her choses in action. 45 Because
of this, no spouse could sue the other. If the wife sued the husband
he would have the right to reduce to possession her choses in ac-
tion.' 4' He would pay damages, but automatically get them back,
circumventing any recovery to the wife. If the husband sued the
wife, in effect, he would be suing himself, because he was liable for
his wife's torts. 47
This legal unity between husband and wife began to deteriorate
when American jurisdictions began to pass statutes, known as
Married Women's Acts, around the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury.148 Shortly thereafter, every American jurisdiction had secured
to a married woman the right to separately own and control prop-
erty and the right to sue and be sued in her own name. 149 These
acts also made the wife separately liable for her own torts. 50 These
statutes have persuaded some states to abrogate interspousal im-
140. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 859 (4th ed. 1971).
141. Act of Nov. 6, 1829, § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1981)).
142. But see Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1980). Florida no longer accepts the fear of
collusive suits as a reason for the immunity.
143. PROSSER, supra note 140, at 859.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 860.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 861.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 861. There were many different kinds of Married Women's Acts, and some of
these expressly refused to authorize suits between husband and wife. For a complete classifi-
cation of these statutes see McCurdy, supra note 17, at 1037.
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munity for personal torts, but have.,been deemed irrelevant to the
application of interspousal immunity by many other states, 151 in-
cluding Florida. 15
2
In the 1979 case Raisen v. Raisen,"5 s the Florida Supreme Court
refused to abrogate interspousal immunity for automobile acci-
dents claiming that the Married Women's Property Act of 1943154
did not affect the fundamental relationship between husband and
wife or the unity of marriage. 55 Justice Alderman, writing for the
majority, stated that it would be illogical for the court to hold that
a property statute had implied a right permitting one spouse to sue
the other for an automobile accident. 56 The court further stated
that, because such suits "disturb domestic tranquility, cause mari-
tal discord and divorce, cause fictitious, collusive, and fraudulent
claims; cause a rise in liability insurance; and promote trivial ac-
tions,"'157 interspousal immunity would be retained. Justice Mc-
Donald concurred specially, stating that the fear of collusive claims
could be handled by the judicial system and that abrogating inter-
spousal immunity to the extent of insurance would prevent disrup-
tion of domestic tranquility. 5 8 He felt, however, that the legisla-
ture should abrogate immunity, not the court.""
The dissenting justices in Raisen made three arguments.8 0 First,
they claimed that the Married Women's Property Act permitted
interspousal suits in a wide range of cases and seriously eroded the
legal unity concept that prohibited suits between spouses.' 6 ' They
were careful to point out that: "By rejecting the common law unity
concept we do not disparage the spiritual and emotional unity
which has been held to exist by virtue of the marriage bond.' ' 62
This statement referred to the Washington Supreme Court's lan-
guage in Freehe v. Freehe.163 The Freehe court stated that the
common law unity of husband and wife referred to the situation
151. See supra note 140 at 861-62.
152. The Florida Supreme Court held so most recently in Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20, 22.
153. 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1979) (Justices England, Adkins and Sundberg dissenting).
154. FLA. STAT. § 708 (1981).
155. 379 So. 2d 352, 354 (Fla. 1979).
156. Id. citing Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 1950).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 355.
159. Id. It is ironic that Justice McDonald subsequently wrote the majority opinion in
Ard, where the court abrogated parental immunity to the extent of insurance.
160. Id. at 356-59.
161. Id. at 357.
162. Id.
163. 500 P.2d 771 (Wash. 1972).
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where a woman's marriage for most purposes rendered her a chat-
tel of her husband and not to the common nature of loving oneness
achieved in a marriage of two free individuals.'64
The second argument raised by the dissenting justices in Raisen
was that domestic harmony is not served by the immunity. In sup-
port of its position, the dissent quoted Dean Prosser's famous criti-
cism of the doctrine:
[The doctrine of interspousal immunity is based] on the bald the-
ory that after a husband has beaten his wife, there is a state of
peace and harmony left to be disturbed; and that if she is suffi-
ciently injured or angry to sue him for it, she will be soothed and
deterred from reprisals by denying her the legal remedy-and
this even though she has left him or divorced him for that very
ground.165
The final argument by the dissent was that the danger of fraud
and collusion was not well founded. 6 " They cite sources to show
that the judicial machinery is able to expose fraudulent claims.' 67
B. Florida's Current Use of Interspousal Immunity
1. Reasons for Retaining Immunity
The Florida Supreme Court was presented with another oppor-
tunity to abrogate interspousal immunity in Hill v. Hill.6 8 In this
case, Mrs. Sheilah Hill was suing her husband, Thomas Hill, for
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment and abuse of process.' 6 '
The First District Court of Appeal pointed out some important
distinctions between this case and Raisen. It stated that the suit
here was for an intentional tort rather than simple negligence, and
as such, it was a poor candidate for a collusive claim. The court
also noted that at the time of the alleged tort, the husband and
wife were separated and that the parties' actions were themselves
disruptive of marital harmony.170
The Florida Supreme Court was not persuaded by these distinc-
164. Id. at 773.
165. Prosser, supra note 140 at 863. But see text accompanying note 178.
166. 379 So. 2d at 358.
167. Id. at 358-59. These same sources are later accepted as persuasive by the majority
in the 1982 Ard case.
168. 415 So. 2d 20.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 22.
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tions but went on to elaborate why interspousal immunity would
not be modified.171 The court stated that to allow a means of re-
covery under the present tort system would seriously affect the
family unit, family financial resources and could result in multiple
interrelated court proceedings. It stated: "We also point out that in
this circumstance we are unable to modify our immunity doctrine
as we did with parental immunity in Ard v. Ard. . . because insur-
ance coverage is not available for intentional torts. 1 7 2 Finally, it
again rejected the proposition that the Married Women's Property
Act had abolished the doctrine of interspousal immunity.
2. Reasons to Waive Immunity to the Extent of Insurance
Analyzing each of the reasons behind the court's decision will
illustrate how Florida can waive interspousal immunity to the ex-
tent of liability insurance to make its use of the immunity more
compatible with parental immunity and its theory of comparative
negligence. Although the reasons for accepting parental and inter-
spousal immunities differed slightly in the past, the justifications
are now identical. As a result, Florida should and can make its use
of the intrafamilial immunities symmetric. To accomplish this, the
court, in reviewing the next interspousal negligence case, 17 3 should
waive interspousal immunity to the extent of liability insurance,
making an exception for exclusion clauses, as it did in Ard.
The court's arguments that apply to intentional torts suits be-
tween spouses simply do not apply to negligence actions. The
court's first premise is that allowing a suit between spouses will
disrupt family harmony and may hinder reconciliation. 174 Yet, al-
lowing negligence actions when insurance is involved will not make
the parties adverse. This was the court's own reasoning in Ard.17 5
The court states that intentional tortious conduct by one spouse
against the other is often followed by a dissolution proceeding and
thus two courts would be required to solve the disputes: one to
determine the tort damages and one to determine dissolution and
child custody matters. 7 This problem will not arise in negligence
actions, as dissolution proceedings are not likely to follow from
171. Id. at 22-24.
172. Id. at 21 (citation omitted).
173. The most recent decisions all dealt with intentional torts, which are not covered by
insurance.
174. Id. at 23.
175. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
176. 415 So. 2d at 23.
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suits involving negligent conduct.
Further, the court states that to allow a tort action would result
in a contingent attorney fee being used in a domestic relations
matter, which is unethical and not conducive to reconciliation. The
tort dispute could, the court continues, be used as a legal tool to
achieve a better settlement in a dissolution proceeding.1 77 This
might be the case for an intentional tort claim as in Hill, but in a
negligence case there will be no peripheral dissolution proceeding
and hence no fears of bargaining with claims or of disrupted recon-
ciliation efforts. In the case of an intentional tort where inter-
spousal immunity would still exist, the trial judge handling the dis-
solution proceeding, "has authority to require an abusive spouse to
pay necessary medical expenses and the authority to consider any
permanent injury or disfigurement or loss of earning capacity from
such abuse when setting alimony. 1 78 In cases where dissolution
usually results, an injured spouse may be able to circumvent the
immunity and receive a civil remedy.
The court's final argument in Hill is that multiple proceedings
could substantially erode family resources for spouses and their
children, even if reconciliation occurs. Yet, as already noted, multi-
ple proceedings are not likely to result in a negligence action.
Moreover, the court's concern with protecting family resources
would actually favor waiving the immunity when insurance is in-
volved because insurance will protect the family resources. Indeed,
the court must have realized in deciding Hill on the same day as
Ard that while there may be reason not to waive the immunity for
intentional torts, there is no reason to keep the immunity for torts
committed by spouses but covered by insurance.
The Florida Supreme Court should have no problem in conclud-
ing that public policy requires it to disregard the antiquated legal
unity concept in order to modify the common law doctrine of inter-
spousal immunity. This modification would be supported by past
Florida decisions and similar decisions in sister states. The impor-
tant public policy consideration in Florida is that the use of the
immunity should be compatible with Florida's theory of compara-
tive negligence. Spouses should pay for the proportion of injury
they caused. The court itself said in Raisen that it has only modi-
177. Id. at 24. Of course, if the court felt that contingency fees were still unethical in
such actions, it could easily restrict contingent fees in interspousal tort claims.
178. Id. at 21. The court is referring to FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1982) (which states that the
court in determining alimony may consider any other factor [not specifically listed] neces-
sary to do equity and justice between the parties).
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fled common law enacted by section 2.01 [encompassing inter-
spousal immunity] where there was "a compelling need for change
and the reason for the law no longer existed." ' e Justice Alderman
then stated that the court modified common law to adopt the the-
ory of comparative negligence because of compelling need for
change. There is a compelling need now to change the common law
doctrine of interspousal immunity in order to make it consistent
with comparative negligence.
Other state high courts have paritally abrogated the immunity
holding that their respective Married Women's Property Acts have
defeated the common law immunity,180 or have simply held that
the common law immunity was not rigidly incorporated into their
state's statutory law.18' The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Im-
mer v. Risko,'s2 waived interspousal immunity for torts arising out
of negligent operation of automobiles. The court said that its com-
mon law incorporating statute "did not incorporate immunity, but
rather [incorporated] the common law with its inherent capacity
for change.'1 3 In Florida the reasons for the immunity no longer
exist in negligence claims and the court must recognize that the
common law's inherent capacity for change allows the court to
modify the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal has already waived inter-
spousal immunity to the extent of the negligent spouse's available
insurance coverage in Tubbs v. Dressler'", stating simply: "On the
basis of Ard as it applies to the parental immunity, there is no
reason in logic or public policy to conclude that the same princi-
ples do not also apply to interspousal immunity."'l8 5 In Tubbs both
spouses died in a plane crash, and the estate of Mrs. Tubbs sued
the estate of Mr. Tubbs and his aircraft liability insurer. 8 6 The
court allowed suit against the husband's estate solely on the
179. 379 So. 2d 352, 354 (Fla. 1979).
180. See, e.g., Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963); Gilman v. Gilman, 95 A. 657
(N.H. 1915).
181. See, e.g., Digby v. Digby, 388 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1978); Immer v. Risko, 267 A.2d 481 (N.J.
1970).
182. 267 A.2d 481 (N.J. 1970).
183. Id. at 483.
184. 7 Fla. L.W. 2094 (5th DCA, September 29, 1982).
185. Id. The court certified this question as being one of great public importance: Is the
doctrine of interspousal immunity, like the doctrine of parental immunity, waived to the
extent of available liability insurance when the action is for a negligent tort causing injury
or death? Id. at 2095.
186. Id. at 2094.
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grounds that insurance existed to cover the accident, 18 7 and as a
result provided family members the right to sue deceased family
members who are insured. Allowing such suits is logical, as, even in
suits against a deceased family member, insurance protects the
harmony and resources of the surviving family members.1 88
Finally, it must be noted that if the court should put the use of
interspousal immunity on the same footing as that of parental im-
munity, one difference in the application of the immunities still
would exist. Because of the court's decision in Shor, the right to
contribution in interspousal suits will not depend on insurance
while the right to contribution in suits between parent and child
will depend on insurance because of the court's decision in Ard.
This different treatment of the right to contribution may be incon-
sistent with Florida's theory of comparative negligence because the
joint tortfeasor of a spouse always has a right to contribution,
whereas the joint tortfeasor of a parent will have his right to con-
tribution depend on the existence of insurance. Because there are
valid reasons for this difference,189 the small disparity in rights to
contribution would be an insignificant price to pay for the court's
successful realignment of the intrafamilial immunities with Flor-
ida's theory of comparative negligence.
The Florida Supreme Court's last two decisions on interspousal
immunity reiterated that interspousal immunity bars claims for in-
tentional torts committed during the marriage but sued upon ei-
ther after dissolution of marriage or after the tortious spouse's
death. 90 In West v. West,"9" the court held that a spouse cannot
sue the other spouse for an intentional tort committed during the
marriage after the marriage has been dissolved by divorce. 9 2 In
Roberts v. Roberts,193 the court held that a spouse cannot sue the
decedent spouse's estate for an intentional tort committed during
marriage, because to allow a claim against the estate "would only
187. The court did not rule on whether the doctrine of interspousal immunity prevents a
spouse's estate from recovery under Florida's wrongful death statute (FLA. STAT. § 768.19),
as the Ard waiver of immunity was held determinative.
188. This is not inconsistent with the Florida Supreme Court's recent decision in Rob-
erts v. Roberts, where the right to sue an intentional tortfeasor spouse who was deceased
was barred. There was no insurance in that case.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 118-123.
190. See West v. West, 414 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1982); Roberts v. Roberts, 414 So. 2d 190
(Fla. 1982).
191. 414 So. 2d 189.
192. The reason being that damages may be considered in deciding on alimony.
193. 414 So. 2d 190.
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add a unique factor to probate of an estate .. . [and] could ad-
versely affect dependent family beneficiaries, particularly minor
children."194
B. Jurisdictions with Different Approaches
A significant number of states have abolished interspousal im-
munity.198 The Minnesota Supreme Court abolished the immunity
in Beaudette v. Frana,96 claiming that the same public policy con-
siderations that prompted it to abrogate parental immunity re-
quired abrogation of interspousal immunity.197 In so doing, the
court mentioned that in allowing suits between spouses, trial
courts must observe that "[t]here is an intimate sharing of contact
within the marriage relationship, both intentional and uninten-
tional, that is uniquely unlike the exposure among strangers."' '
The court explained that because of the unique relationship be-
tween spouses, not all contact and injury that would be tortious
between strangers would qualify as tortious between spouses. 19 9 A
jury determination of whether two adults have acted reasonably
towards each other appears to be an easier task than a jury deter-
mination of whether a parent has acted reasonably in caring for
and disciplining his children. An adult's conduct with other adults
is more standardized than an adult's conduct with his children.
The jury determination of reasonableness is not the problem with
this approach, but rather the problem is that it allows for disrup-
tion of family harmony and family resources.
Another approach is to waive interspousal immunity in automo-
bile negligence cases. The Massachusetts Supreme Court did this
in the case of Lewis v. Lewis.200 The court based its decision on the
fact that an auto accident does not require a jury to delve into the
rights and privileges that exist between husband and wife. This
eliminates any fear that the jury will be mandating which inter-
194. Id. at 191.
195. See 92 A.L.R.3d 901 § 13 (1979). Twenty-four states have abolished interspousal
immunity. They are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
196. 173 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1969).
197. See, e.g., Merenoff v. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 951 (N.J. 1978); Freehe v. Freehe, 500
P.2d 771 (Wash. 1972).
198. 173 N.W.2d at 420.
199. See, generally, 173 N.W.2d 416.
200. 351 N.E.2d 526 (Mass. 1976).
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spousal activities are reasonable.
Some states make an exception to interspousal immunity when
intentional tortious conduct is involved. The Texas Supreme Court
provided the rationale for this exception in Bounds v. Candle2 0 1
when it stated, "The peace and harmony of a home which has al-
ready been strained to the point where an intentional physical at-
tack could take place will not be further impaired by allowing a
suit to be brought to recover damages for the attack. 2 0 2 Florida
does not recognize this exception because allowing suits for inten-
tional torts would hinder possible reconciliation and an alternative
civil remedy is provided by a dissolution proceeding for those un-
willing to reconcile.20
The last area of disagreement among the states as to the use of
interspousal immunity focuses on the time that the immunity at-
taches to an act of tortious conduct. If a spouse is injured prior to
the marriage, some states hold that the immunity will not prevent
her from suing for the tort while married. In Moulton v.
Moulton,0 4 the Maine Supreme Court held that the subsequent
marriage of the parties did not prevent an action for a tort occur-
ring prior to the marriage. It reasoned that the common law did
not prevent the woman from having her own cause of action before
marriage and that the Married Women's Property Statute allowed
a woman to retain her own cause of action in marriage; hence the
legal unity of husband and wife did not bar her cause of action in
tort just because she got married. The other view is that the immu-
nity does bar a suit for premarital torts while the couple is mar-
ried. Florida adopted this view in Gatson v. Pittman,0 3 holding
that while a spouse couldn't sue on the claim during marriage, she
could sue should she ever get divorced.
Whether a spouse has the right to sue after the marriage has
ended for a tort committed during the marriage is also treated dif-
ferently by different states. The view of Utah and some other
states is that a spouse may sue on the tort after the marriage has
ended by divorce.2 0 6 The Utah Supreme Court reasoned that the
threat to marital harmony no longer exists in such a case. The
Florida Supreme Court, on the other hand, in the case of West v.
201. 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1977).
202. Id. at 927.
203. See Hill 415 So. 2d 20.
204. 309 A.2d 224 (Me. 1973).
205. 224 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1969).
206. Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980).
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West,20 7 has held that even though the marriage has ended by di-
vorce, no cause of action can be brought for tortious conduct dur-
ing the marriage because an alternate civil remedy exists in the
dissolution. The Supreme Court of Missouri prevented a suit after
divorce for a different reason in Ebel v. Ferguson, °0 explaining
that, because of the common law principle of unity of husband and
wife, no valid claim even arose.20 9 Some states have treated the
death of one spouse as a circumstance in which the immunity may
be waived, while some other jurisdictions still use the immunity to
prevent suit even though one spouse has died.210 It appears that a
state's interpretation of the purposes served by the immunities will
prescribe the circumstances in which the immunity will be applied.
IV. CONCLUSION
States have used intrafamilial tort immunities to different de-
grees and for different purposes. Recently some states have se-
verely modified the use of the immunities realizing that the immu-
nities cannot adequately protect the family unit in many
circumstances. Florida has sought to protect family resources and
family harmony from intrusion by intrafamilial suits. The Florida
Supreme Court has recognized that insurance can protect family
resources and tranquility. It was for this reason that the court
waived parental immunity to the extent of liability insurance cov-
erage. Yet the Florida Supreme Court has left the job half done.
Interspousal immunity must be waived to the extent of liability
insurance coverage because insurance preserves family resources
and tranquility in these suits as well. There is no reason to deprive
a spouse of a civil remedy when insurance can substitute in pro-
tecting the family. If the supreme court leaves the intrafamilial im-
munities in their current state, the court will be inconsistent with
its own logic and its own precedent. Waiving interspousal immu-
nity to the extent of insurance will increase a spouse's right to civil
redress to the same level as a minor's and will make the use of the
immunities wholly consistent with Florida's theory of comparative
negligence. The court can do this and at the same time preserve
the family unit.
207. 414 So. 2d 189.
208. 478 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. 1972).
209. Some jurisdictions, such as Florida, would claim that a cause of action would exist,
but would just be indefinitely suspended by the immunity.
210. 92 A.L.R.3D 901 §§ 31-32 (1979).
